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Abstract
In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This
account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account
lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex
numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave
function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its
amplitude and phase degrees of freedom.
Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in
Science Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing
impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a
genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics.
I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominal-
ization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate
about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to
extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable
number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation).
Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call
a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well
as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further
investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure.
Keywords: quantum mechanics, wave function, phase structure, mathematical nom-
inalism, intrinsic physical theory, indispensability argument, mathematical platonism,
metaphysics of science.
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1 Introduction
No doubt quantum mechanics is empirically successful (at least in the non-relativistic
domain). But what it means remains highly controversial. Since its initial formulation,
there have been many debates (in physics and in philosophy) about the ontology of
a quantum-mechanical world. Chief among them is a serious foundational question
about how best to understand the quantum-mechanical laws and the origin of
quantum randomness. That is the topic of the quantum measurement problem
(which arguably is a problem in physics which we should evaluate the solutions
on the basis of empirical and super-empirical virtues). At the time of writing this
paper, the following are serious contenders for being the best solution: Bohmian
mechanics (BM), spontaneous localization theories (GRW0, GRWf, GRWm, CSL),
and Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM and Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI)).
There are deeper questions about quantum mechanics that have a philosophical
and metaphysical flavor. Opening a standard textbook on quantum mechanics, we
find an abundance of mathematical objects: Hilbert spaces, operators, matrices,
wave functions, and etc. But what do they represent in the physical world? Are
they ontologically serious to the same degree or are some merely dispensable
instruments that facilitate calculations? In recent debates in philosophy of physics,
there is considerable agreement that the universal wave function, modulo some
mathematical degrees of freedom, represents something genuinely physical — the
quantum state. In contrast, matrices and operators are convenient summaries but in
no way essential to a fundamental description of the world.
However, the meaning of the quantum state is still unclear. We know its
mathematical representation very well: a wave function, which is crucially involved
in the dynamics of BM, GRW, and EQM. In the position representation, a scalar-
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valued wave function is a square-integrable function from the configuration space
R3N to the complex plane C. But what does the wave function really mean? There
are two ways of pursuing this question:
1. What kind of “thing” does the wave function represent? Does it represent a
physical field on the configuration space, something quasi-nomological, or a
sui generis entity in its own ontological category?
2. What is the physical basis for the mathematics used for the wave function?
Which mathematical degrees of freedom of the wave function are physically
genuine? What is the metaphysical explanation for the merely mathematical or
gauge degrees of freedom?
Much of the philosophical literature on the metaphysics of the wave function has
pursued the first line of questions.1 In this paper, I will pursue the second one.
In particular, I will introduce an intrinsic theory of the quantum state. It answers
the second line of questions by making explicit the physical basis for the usefulness
of the mathematics of the wave function and providing a metaphysical explanation
for why certain degrees of freedom in the wave function (the scale of the amplitude
and the overall phase) are merely gauge. My intrinsic theory will also have the
feature that the fundamental ontology does not include abstract mathematical objects
such as complex numbers, functions, vectors, or sets.
My theory is therefore nominalistic in the sense of Hartry Field (1980). Recall: in
his influential monograph Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism, Field
advances a new approach to philosophy of mathematics by explicitly constructing
nominalistic counterparts of the platonistic physical theories. In particular, he
nominalizes Newtonian gravitation theory.2 In the same spirit, Frank Arntzenius
and Cian Dorr (2011) develop a nominalization of differential manifolds, laying
down the foundation of a nominalistic theory of general relativity. Up until now,
however, there has been no successful nominalization of quantum theory. In fact, it
has been an open problem–both conceptually and mathematically–how it is to be
done. The non-existence of a nominalistic quantum mechanics has encouraged much
skepticism about Field’s program of nominalizing fundamental physics and much
optimism about the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument for Mathematical
Objects. Indeed, there is a long-standing conjecture, due to David Malament (1982),
that Field’s nominalism would not succeed in quantum mechanics.
Therefore, being nominalistic, my intrinsic theory of the quantum state would
advance Field’s nominalistic project and provide (the first step of) an answer to
Malament’s skepticism. Moreover, it will shed light on several related issues in the
metaphysics of quantum mechanics.
Here is the roadmap: I will first explain (in §2) the two visions for a fundamental
physical theory of the world: the intrinsic vision and the nominalistic vision. I will
1Albert (1996), Loewer (1996), Wallace and Timpson (2010), North (2012), Ney (2012), Maudlin
(2013), Goldstein and Zanghì (2013), Miller (2013), Bhogal and Perry (2015), Chen (forthcoming), and
Chen (ms.).
2It is not quite complete as it leaves out integration.
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then discuss why quantum theory may seem to resist the intrinsic and nominalistic
reformulation. Next (in §3), I will write down an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of
the quantum state. Finally (in §4), I will discuss (1) how this account bears on the
nature of phase and the debate about wave function realism, and (2) in which ways
my account is superior to the account in Balaguer (1996). I will also briefly sketch
how to extend the present account of the quantum state to a variable number of
particles (e.g. in the presence of particle creation and annihilation), how to develop
a Schrödinger dynamics in terms of the intrinsic relations, and how to carry out
nominalistic integration to obtain probabilities (to be written in a sequel paper).
Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a
“periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a unique-
ness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into
the metaphysics of quantum mechanics.
2 The Two Visions and the Quantum Obstacle
There are, broadly speaking, two grand visions for what a fundamental physical
theory of the world should look like. (And of course there exist other visions and
aspirations.) The first is what I shall call the intrinsicalist vision, the requirement
that the fundamental theory be written in a form without any reference to arbitrary
conventions such as coordinate systems and units of scale. The second is the
nominalistic vision, the requirement that the fundamental theory be written without
any reference to mathematical objects. The first one is familiar to mathematical
physicists from the development of synthetic geometry and differential geometry.
The second one is familiar to philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of
physics working on the ontological commitment of physical theories. First, I will
describe the two visions, explain their motivations, and illustrate with some examples.
Next, I will explain why quantum mechanics seems to frustrate both programs.
2.1 The Intrinsicalist Vision
The intrinsicalist vision is best illustrated with some history of Euclidean geometry.
Euclid succeeded in showing that complex geometrical facts can be demonstrated
using rigorous proof on the basis of simple axioms. However, Euclid’s axioms do
not mention real numbers or coordinate systems, for they were not yet discovered.
They are stated with only predicates of congruence and betweenness. With these
concepts, Euclid was able to derive a large body of geometrical propositions stated
in terms of congruence and betweenness.
Real numbers and coordinate systems were introduced to facilitate the derivations.
With the full power of real analysis, the metric function defined on pairs of tuples of
coordinate numbers can greatly speed up the calculations, which usually take up
many steps of logical derivation on Euclid’s approach. But what are the significance
of the real numbers and coordinate systems? When representing a 3-dimensional
Euclidean space, a typical choice is to use R3. It is clear that such a representation
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Figure 1: Euclid’s Windmill proof of the Pythagorean Theorem. No coordinate
systems or real numbers were used. Cartesian coordinates were invented much later
to facilitate derivations.
has much surplus (or excess) structure: the origin of the coordinate system, the
orientation of the axis, and the scale are all arbitrarily chosen (sometimes conveniently
chosen for ease of calculation). There is “more information” or “more structure” in
R3 than in the 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In other words, the R3 representation
has gauge degrees of freedom.
The real, intrinsic structure in the 3-dimensional Euclidean space–the structure
that is represented by R3 up to the Euclidean transformations–can be understood
as an axiomatic structure of congruence and betweenness. In fact, Hilbert 1899
and Tarski 1959 give us ways to make this statement more precise. After offering a
rigorous axiomatization of Euclidean geometry, they prove a representation theorem:
any structure instantiates the betweenness and congruence axioms of 3-dimensional
Euclidean geometry if and only if there is a 1-1 embedding function from the structure
onto R3 such that if we define a metric function in the usual Pythagorean way then
the metric function is homomorphic: it preserves the exact structure of betweenness
and congruence. Moreover, they prove a uniqueness theorem: any other embedding
function defined on the same domain satisfies the same conditions of homomorphism
if and only if it is a Euclidean transformation of the original embedding function: a
transformation on R3 that can be obtained by some combination of shift of origin,
reflection, rotation, and positive scaling.
The formal results support the idea that we can think of the genuine, intrinsic
features of 3-dimensional Euclidean space as consisting directly of betweenness
and congruence relations on spatial points, and we can regard the coordinate
system (R3) and the metric function as extrinsic representational features we bring
to speed up calculations. (Example: Figure 1. Exercise: please try to prove the
Pythagorean Theorem with and without real-numbered coordinate systems.) The
merely representational artifacts are highly useful but still dispensable.
There are several advantages of having an intrinsic formulation of geometry. First,
it eliminates the need for a large class of arbitrary conventions: where to place the
origin, how to orient the axis, and what scale to use. Second, in the absence of these
arbitrary conventions, we can look directly into the real structure of the geometrical
objects without worrying that we are looking at some merely representational artifact
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(or gauge degrees of freedom). This gives us a more perspicuous picture of the
geometrical reality.
The lessons we learn from the history of Euclidean geometry can be extended to
other parts of physics. For example, people have long noticed that there are many
gauge degrees of freedom in the representation of both scalar and vector valued
physical quantities: temperature, mass, potential, and field values. There has been
much debate in philosophy of physics about what structure is physically genuine and
and what is merely gauge. It would therefore be helpful to go beyond the scope of
physical geometry and extend the intrinsic approach to physical theories in general.
Hartry Field (1980), building on previous work by Krantz et al. (1971), ingeniously
extends the intrinsic approach to Newtonian gravitation theory. The result is an
elimination of arbitrary choices of zero field value and units of mass. His conjecture
is that all physical theories can be “intrinsicalized” in one way or another.
2.2 The Nominalist Vision
As mentioned earlier, Field (1980) provides an intrinsic version of Newtonian
gravitation theory. But the main motivation and the major achievement of his project
is a defense of nominalism, the thesis that there are no abstract entities, and, in
particular, no abstract mathematical entities such as numbers, functions, and sets.
The background for Field’s nominalistic project is the classic debate between the
mathematical nominalist and the mathematical platonist, the latter of whom is onto-
logically committed to the existence of abstract mathematical objects. Field identifies
that a main problem of maintaining nominalism is the apparent indispensability of
mathematical objects in formulating our best physical theories:
Since I deny that numbers, functions, sets, etc. exist, I deny that it is
legitimate to use terms that purport to refer to such entities, or variables
that purport to range over such entities, in our ultimate account of what
the world is really like.
This appears to raise a problem: for our ultimate account of what
the world is really like must surely include a physical theory; and
in developing physical theories one needs to use mathematics; and
mathematics is full of such references to and quantifications over numbers,
functions, sets, and the like. It would appear then that nominalism is not
a position that can reasonably be maintained.3
In other words, the main task of defending nominalism would be to respond to the
Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument:4
3Field (2016), Preliminary Remarks, p.1.
4The argument was originally proposed by W. V. Quine and later developed by Putnam (1971).
This version is from Colyvan (2015).
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P1 We ought to be ontologically committed to all and only those entities that
are indispensable to our best theories of the world. [Quine’s Criterion of
Ontological Commitment]
P2 Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best theories of the world. [The
Indispensability Thesis]
C Therefore, we ought to be ontologically committed to mathematical entities.
In particular, Field’s task is to refute the second premise–the Indispensability
Thesis. Field proposes to reformulate all physical theories into attractive nominalistic
versions that do not quantify over mathematical objects.
Field’s nominalistic versions of physical theories would have significant advan-
tages over their platonistic counterparts. First, the nominalistic versions illuminate
what exactly in the physical world provide the explanations for the usefulness of
any particular mathematical representation. After all, even for a platonist, she might
accept that numbers and coordinate systems do not really exist in the physical world
but merely represent some concrete physical reality. She merely disputes that we
can do physics without the mathematical objects. Second, as Field has argued,
the nominalistic physics seems to provide better explanations than the platonistic
counterparts, for the latter would involve explanation of physical phenomena by
things (such as numbers) external to the physical processes themselves.
Field has partially succeeded by writing down an intrinsic theory of physical
geometry and Newtonian gravitation, as it contains no explicit first-order quantifi-
cation over mathematical objects, thus qualifying his theory as nominalistic. But
what about other theories? Despite the initial success of his project, there has been
significant skepticism about whether his project can extend beyond Newtonian
gravitation theory to more advanced theories such as quantum mechanics.
2.3 Obstacles From Quantum Theory
We have looked at the motivations for the two visions for what the fundamental
theory of the world should look like: the intrinsic vision and the nominalistic vision.
They should not be thought of as competing against each other. They often converge
on a common project. Indeed, Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitation
Theory is both intrinsic and nominalistic.5
Both have had considerable success in certain segments of classical theories. But
with the rich mathematical structures and abstract formalisms in quantum mechanics,
both seem to run into obstacles.
5Moreover, the intrinsicalist and nominalistic visions can also come apart. For example, we can, in
the case of mass quantities, adopt an intrinsic but platonistic theory of mass ratios. We can also adopt
an extrinsic but nominalistic theory of mass relations by using some arbitrary object (say, my water
bottle) as standing for unit mass and assigning comparative relations between that arbitrary object
and every other object.
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David Malament was one of the earliest critics of the nominalistic vision. He
voiced his skepticism in his influential review of Field’s book. Malament states his
general worry as follows:
Suppose Field wants to give some physical theory a nominalistic refor-
mulation. Further suppose the theory determines a class of mathematical
models, each of which consists of a set of “points” together with certain
mathematical structures defined on them. Field’s nominalization strategy
cannot be successful unless the objects represented by the points are ap-
propriately physical (or non-abstract)...But in lots of cases the represented
objects are abstract. (Malament (1982), pp. 533, emphasis original.)
Given his general worry that, often in physical theories, it is abstracta that are
represented in the state spaces, Malament conjectures that, in the specific case of
quantum mechanics, Field’s strategy of nominalization would not “have a chance”:
Here [in the context of quantum mechanics] I do not really see how Field
can get started at all. I suppose one can think of the theory as determining
a set of models—each a Hilbert space. But what form would the recovery
(i.e., representation) theorem take? The only possibility that comes to
mind is a theorem of the sort sought by Jauch, Piron, et al. They start
with “propositions” (or “eventualities”) and lattice-theoretic relations
as primitive, and then seek to prove that the lattice of propositions is
necessarily isomorphic to the lattice of subspaces of some Hilbert space.
But of course no theorem of this sort would be of any use to Field. What
could be worse than propositions (or eventualities)? (Malament (1982), pp.
533-34.)6
As I understand it, Malament suggests that there are no good places to start
nominalizing non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is because the obvious
starting point, according to Malament and other commentators, is the Hilbert space.
However, prima facie, this starting point seems strange for at least two reasons.
First, it is hard to see what concrete physical structure can provide the basis for
a representation theorem of the kind sought after by the nominalist. But more
importantly, as we have learned from the debates in quantum foundations, although
the Hilbert space is a convenient device for the mathematical formulation, it is
dispensable for a sound ontological interpretation of quantum theories, platonistic
or otherwise. To connect quantum formalism to the real-world laboratory results, we
represent the quantum state as a wave function on a high-dimensional configuration
space, which is constructed from particle configurations in the physical space. The
Hilbert space is merely a space of possible wave functions; but each wave function is
6Malament also gives the example of classical Hamiltonian mechanics as another specific instance
of the general worry. But this is not the place to get into classical mechanics. Suffice to say that
there are several ways to nominalize classical mechanics. Field’s nominalistic Newtonian Gravitation
Theory is one way. Arntzenius and Dorr (2011) provides another way.
8
defined as a function from the configuration space to complex values. Thus, being
much more closely related to the physical space(time), the configuration space seems
to be a more natural place to start for the nominalization project. However, the
problem that Malament raises remains, because (prima facie) it is not clear how to
think about the configuration space in the nominalistic framework. Therefore, at
least prima facie, quantum mechanics seems to frustrate the nominalistic vision.
Moreover, the mathematics of quantum mechanics comes with much conventional
structure that is hard to get rid of. For example, we know that the exact value of the
amplitude of the wave function is not important. For that matter, we can scale it
with any arbitrary positive constant. It is true that we usually choose the scale such
that we get unity when integrating the amplitude over the entire configuration space.
But that is merely conventional. We can, for example, write down the Born rule with
a proportionality constant to get unity in the probability function:
P(x ∈ X) = Z∫
X
∣Ψ(x)∣2dx,
where Z is a normalization constant.
Another example is the overall phase of the wave function. As we learn from
modular arithmetic, the exact value of the phase of the wave function is not physically
significant, as we can add a constant phase factor to every point in configuration
space and the wave function will remain physically the same: producing exactly the
same predictions in terms of probabilities.
All these gauge degrees of freedom are frustrating from the point of view of
the intrinsicalist vision. What exactly is going on in the real world that allows for
these gauge degrees of freedom but not others? What is the most metaphysically
perspicuous picture of the quantum state, represented by the wave function? Many
people would respond that the quantum state is projective, meaning that the state
space for the quantum state is not the Hilbert space, but its quotient space: the
projective Hilbert space. It can be obtained by quotienting the usual Hilbert space
with the equivalence relation ψ ∼ Reiθψ. But this does little to relieve frustrations.
These people face a similar question: what exactly is going on in the real world
that allows for quotienting with this equivalence relation but not others?7 No one,
as far as I know, has offered an intrinsic picture of the quantum state, even in the
non-relativistic domain.
In short, at least prima facie, both the intrinsicalist vision and the nominalist vision
are challenged by quantum mechanics.
7These questions, I believe, are in the same spirit as Ted Sider’s 2016 Locke Lecture (ms.), and
especially his final lecture on theoretical equivalence and against what he calls“quotienting by hand.”
9
3 An Intrinsic and Nominalistic Account of the Quantum State
In this section, I will propose a new theory of the quantum state based on some
crucial lessons we learned from the debates about wave function realism.8 As we
shall see, it does not take much to overcome the “quantum obstacle.” For simplicity, I
will focus on the case of a quantum state for a constant number of identical particles
without spin.
3.1 The Mathematics of the Quantum State
First, let me explain my strategy for nominalizing non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
1. I will start with a Newtonian space-time, whose nominalization is readily
available.9
2. I will use symmetries as a guide to fundamentality and identify the intrinsic
structure of the quantum state on the Newtonian space-time. This will be
the goal for the remaining part of the paper. (Here we focus only on the
quantum state, because it is novel and it seems to resist nominalization. But the
theory leaves room for additional ontologies of particles, fields, mass densities
supplied by specific interpretations of QM; these additional ontologies are
readily nominalizable.)
3. In future work, I will develop nominalistic translations of the dynamical
equations and generalize this account to accommodate more complicated
quantum theories.
Before we get into the intrinsic structure of the quantum state, we need to say a
bit more about its mathematical structure. For the quantum state of a spinless system
at a time t (see Figure 2), we can represent it with a scalar-valued wave function:
Ψt ∶ R3N → C,
where N is the number of particles in the system, R3N is the configuration space of N
particles, and C is the complex plane. (For the quantum state of a system with spin,
we can use a vector-valued wave function whose range is the spinor space—C2N .)
My strategy is to start with a Newtonian space-time (which is usually represented
by a Cartesian product of a 3-dimensional Euclidean space and a 1-dimensional
8Here I’m taking the “Hard Road” to nominalism. As such, my goal is to reformulate quantum
mechanics such that within the theory it no longer refers (under first-order quantifiers) to mathematical
objects such as numbers, functions, or sets. To arrive at my theory, and to state and prove the
representation theorems, I use and refer to a lot of mathematics. But these are parts of the meta-theory
to explicate the relation between my account and the platonistic counterpart and to argue (by reductio)
against the indispensability thesis. Thanks to Andrea Oldofredi for suggesting that I make this clear.
9It is an interesting question what role Galilean relativity plays in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. In future work, I’d like to say more about its significance and how it relates to the
nominalistic theory.
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Figure 2: A wave function for a two-particle system in 1-dim space. Source:
www.physics.auckland.ac.nz
time). If we want to nominalize the quantum state, what should we do with the
configuration space R3N? As is now familiar from the debate about wave function
realism, there are two ways of interpreting the fundamental physical space for a
quantum world:
1. R3N represents the fundamental physical space; the space represented by R3
only appears to be real; the quantum state assigns a complex number to each
point in R3N. (See Figure 2. Analogy: classical field.)
2. R3 represents the fundamental physical space; the space represented byR3N is a
mathematical construction—the configuration space; the quantum state assigns
a complex number to each region in R3 that contains N points (i.e. irregular
and disconnected regions are allowed). (Analogy: multi-field)
Chen (forthcoming) argues that given our current total evidence, option (2) is
a much better interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. I will not
rehearse the arguments here. But one of the key ideas is that we can think of the
complex-valued function as really “living on” the 3-dimensional physical space, in
the sense that it assigns a complex number not to each point but each N-element
region in physical space. We call that a “multi-field.”10
Taking the wave function into a framework friendly for further nominalization,
we can perform the familiar technique of decomposing the complex number Reiθ
into two real numbers: the amplitude R and the phase θ. That is, we can think of the
compex-valued multi-field in the physical space as two real-valued multi-fields:
R(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN), θ(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN).
Here, since we are discussing Newtonian space-time, the x1.....xN are simultaneous
space-time points. We can think of them as: (xα1 ,xβ1 ,xγ1 ,xt), (xα2 ,xβ2 ,xγ2 ,xt), ......,(xαN ,xβN ,xγN ,xt).
10Unfortuantely, this is a misleading label for this object. I am following Belot (2012) here. See
Arntzenius and Dorr (2011) for a completely different object called the “multi-field.”
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Now the task before us is just to nominalize and intrinsicalize the two multi-fields.
In §3.2 and §3.3, we will find two physical structures (Quantum State Amplitude
and Quantum State Phase), which, via the appropriate representation theorems and
uniqueness theorems, justify the use of complex numbers and explain the gauge
degrees of freedom in the quantum wave function.11
3.2 Quantum State Amplitude
The amplitude part of the quantum state is (like mass density) on the ratio scale, i.e.
the physical structure should be invariant under ratio transformations
R→ αR.
We will start with the Newtonian space-time and help ourselves to the structure of
N-Regions: collection of all regions that contain exactly N simultaneous space-time
points (which are irregular and disconnected regions). We start here because we
would like to have a physical realization of the platonistic configuration space. The
solution is to identify configuration points with certain special regions of the physical
space-time.12
In addition to N-Regions, the quantum state amplitude structure will contain
two primitive relations:
• A two-place relation Amplitude–Geq (⪰A).
• A three-place relation Amplitude–Sum (S).
11In the case of a vector-valued wave function, since the wave function value consists in 2N complex
numbers, where N is the number of particles, we would need to nominalize 2N+1 real-valued functions:
R1(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN), θ1(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN),R2(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN), θ2(x1,x2,x3, ...,xN), ......
But there is an additional wrinkle of how to best handle the gauge degrees of freedom in the orientation
in the spin-space. I shall leave that to future work.
12Notes on mereology: As I am taking for granted that quantum mechanics for indistinguishable
particles (sometimes called identical particles) works just as well as quantum mechanics for distin-
guishable particles, I do not require anything more than Atomistic General Extensional Mereology
(AGEM). That is, the mereological system that validate the following principles: Partial Ordering
of Parthood, Strong Supplementation, Unrestricted Fusion, and Atomicity. See Varzi (2016) for a
detailed discussion.
However, I leave open the possibility for adding structures in N-Regions to distinguish among
different ways of forming regions from the same collection of points, corresponding to permuted
configurations of distinguishable particles. We might need to introduce additional structure for
mereological composition to distinguish between mereological sums formed from the same atoms
but in different orders. This might also be required when we have entangled quantum states of
different species of particles. To achieve this, perhaps we can borrow some ideas from Kit Fine’s
“rigid embodiment” and add primitive ordering relations to enrich the structure of mereological sums.
For helpful explanations for how to understand the Symmetrization and Anti-Symmetrization
Postulates in the context of constructing dynamics for indistinguishable particles, see Dürr et al. (2006)
and Dürr et al. (2007). For philosophical discussions about how it relates to the debate about wave
function realism, see Chen (forthcoming).
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Interpretation: a ⪰A b iff the amplitude of N-Region a is greater than or equal to
that of N-Region b; S(a, b, c) iff the amplitude of N-Region c is the sum of those of
N-Regions a and b.
Define the following short-hand (all quantifiers below range over only N-Regions):
1. a =A b ∶= a ⪰A b and b ⪰A a.
2. a ≻A b ∶= a ⪰A b and not b ⪰A a.
Next, we can write down some axioms for Amplitude–Geq and Amplitude–Sum.13
Again, all quantifiers below range over only N-Regions. ∀a, b, c ∶
G1 (Connectedness) Either a ⪰A b or b ⪰A a.
G2 (Transitivity) If a ⪰A b and b ⪰A c, then a ⪰A c.
S1 (Associativity*) If ∃x s.t. S(a, b,x) and ∀x′ [if S(a, b,x′)) then ∃y s.t. S(x′, c, y)],
then ∃z s.t. S(b, c, z) and ∀z′ [if S(b, c, z′)) then ∃w s.t. S(a, z′,w)] and ∀ f , f ′, g, g′
[if S(a, b, f ) ∧ S( f , c, f ′) ∧ S(b, c, g) ∧ S(a, g, g′), then f ′ ⪰A g′].
S2 (Monotonicity*) If ∃x s.t. S(a, c,x) and a ⪰A b, then ∃y s.t. S(c, b, y) and ∀ f , f ′ [if
S(a, c, f ) ∧ S(c, b, f ′) then f ⪰A f ′].
S3 (Density) If a ≻A b, then ∃d,x [S(b,d,x) and ∀ f , if S(b,x, f ), then a ⪰A f ].
S4 (Non-Negativity) If S(a, b, c), then c ⪰A a.
13Compare with the axioms in Krantz et al. (1971) Defn.3.3: Let A be a nonempty set, ⪰ a binary
relation on A, B a nonempty subset of A ×A, and ○ a binary function from B into A. The quadruple< A,⪰,B, ○ > is an extensive structure with no essential maximum if the following axioms are satisfied
for all a, b, c ∈ A:
1. < A,⪰> is a weak order. [This is translated as G1 and G2.]
2. If (a, b) ∈ B and (a ○ b, c) ∈ B, then (b, c) ∈ B, (a, b ○ c) ∈ B, and (a ○ b) ○ c ⪰A a ○ (b ○ c). [This is
translated as S1.]
3. If (a, c) ∈ B and a ⪰ b, then (c, b) ∈ B, and a ○ c ⪰ c ○ b. [This is translated as S2.]
4. If a ≻ b, then there exists d ∈ A s.t. (b,d) ∈ B and a ⪰ b ○ d. [This is translated as S3.]
5. If a ○ b = c, then c ≻ a. [This is translated as S4, but allowing N-Regions to have null amplitudes.
The representation function will also be zero-valued at those regions.]
6. Every strictly bounded standard sequence is finite, where a1, ..., an, ... is a standard sequence if
for n = 2, .., an = an−1 ○a1, and it is strictly bounded if for some b ∈ A and for all an in the sequence,
b ≻ an. [This is translated as S5. The translation uses the fact that Axiom 6 is equivalent to
another formulation of the Archimedean axiom: {n∣na is defined and b ≻ na} is finite.]
The complications in the nominalistic axioms come from the fact that there can be more than one
N-Regions that are the Amplitude-Sum of two N-Regions: ∃a, b, c,d s.t. S(a, b, c) ∧ S(a, b,d) ∧ c ≠ d.
However, in the proof for the representation and uniqueness theorems, we can easily overcome these
complications by taking equivalence classes of equal amplitude and recover the amplitude addition
function from the Amplitude-Sum relation.
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S5 (Archimedean Property) ∀a1, b, if ¬S(a1, a1, a1) and ¬S(b, b, b), then ∃a1, a2, ..., an
s.t. b ≻A an and ∀ai [if b ≻A ai, then an ⪰A ai], where ai’s, if they exist, have the
following properties: S(a1, a1, a2), S(a1, a2, a3), S(a1, a3, a4), ..., S(a1, an−1, an).14
Since these axioms are the nominalistic translations of a platonistic structure
in Krantz et al. (Defn. 3.3), we can formulate the representation and uniqueness
theorems for the amplitude structure:
Theorem 3.1 (Amplitude Representation Theorem) <N-Regions, Amplitude–Geq,
Amplitude–Sum> satisfies axioms (G1)—(G2) and (S1)—(S5), only if there is a function
R ∶ N-Regions→ {0} ∪R+ such that ∀a, b ∈ N-Regions:
1. a ⪰A b⇔ R(a) ≥ R(b);
2. If ∃x s.t. S(a, b,x), then ∀c [if S(a, b, c) then R(c) = R(a) +R(b)].
Theorem 3.2 (Amplitude Uniqueness Theorem) If another function R′ satisfies the
conditions on the RHS of the Amplitude Representation Theorem, then there exists a real
number α > 0 such that for all nonmaximal element a ∈ N-Regions, R′(a) = αR(a).
Proofs: See Krantz et al. (1971), Sections 3.4.3, 3.5, pp. 84-87. Our primitives are
slightly different from the ones used by Krantz et al., because we assume that there
may be several N-Regions whose amplitude is the sum of that of two N-Regions.
To modify their proof, we can construct equivalence classes N-Regions / =A, where
a =A b if a ⪰A b ∧ b ⪰A a, on which we can define an addition function from the
Amplitude-Sum relation.
14S5 is an infinitary sentence, as the quantifiers in the consequent should be understood as infinite
disjunctions of quantified sentences. However, S5 can also be formulated with a stronger axiom called
Dedekind Completeness, whose platonistic version says:
Dedekind Completeness. ∀M,N ⊂ A, if ∀x ∈ M,∀y ∈ N, y ≻ x, then there exists z ∈ A s.t. ∀x ∈ M, z ≻
x and ∀y ∈ N, y ≻ z.
The nominalistic translation can be done in two ways. We can introduce two levels of mereology so
as to distinguish regions of points and regions of regions of points. Alternatively, as Tom Donaldson,
Jennifer Wang, and Gabriel Uzquiano suggest to me, perhaps I can make do with plural quantification
in the following way. For example ( with ∝ for the logical predicate “is one of” ), here is one way to
state the Dedekind Completeness with plural quantification:
Dedekind Completeness Nom Pl. ∀mm,nn ∈ N-Regions, if ∀x ∝ mm,∀y ∝ nn, y ≻ x, then there
exists z ∈ A s.t. ∀x ∝ mm, z ≻ x and ∀y ∝ nn, y ≻ z.
We only need the Archimedean property in the proof. Since Dedekind Completeness is stronger,
the proof in Krantz et al. (1971), pp. 84-87 can still go through if we assume Dedekind Completeness
Nom Pl.
This way of writing down the last axiom has the virtue of avoiding the infinitary sentences included
in S5. Note: this is the point where we have to trade off certain nice features of first-order logic
and standard mereology with the desiderata of the intrinsic and nominalistic account. (I have no
problem with infinitary sentences in S5. But one is free to choose instead to use plural quantification
to formulate the last axiom as Dedekind Completeness Nom Pl.) This is related to Field’s worry in
Science Without Numbers, Ch. 9, “Logic and Ontology.”
14
The representation theorem suggests that the intrinsic structure of Amplitude-Geq
and Amplitude-Sum guarantees the existence of a faithful representation function.
But the intrinsic structure makes no essential quantification over numbers, functions,
sets, or matrices. The uniqueness theorem explains why the gauge degrees of
freedom are the positive multiplication transformations and no further, i.e. why the
amplitude function is unique up to a positive normalization constant.
3.3 Quantum State Phase
The phase part of the quantum state is (like angles on a plane) of the periodic
scale, i.e. the intrinsic physical structure should be invariant under overall phase
transformations
θ→ θ +φ mod 2pi.
We would like something of the form of a “difference structure.” But we know
that according to standard formalism, just the absolute values of the differences
would not be enough, for time reversal on the quantum state is implemented by
taking the complex conjugation of the wave function, which is an operation that
leaves the absolute values of the differences unchanged. So we will try to construct a
signed difference structure such that standard operations on the wave function are
faithfully preserved.15
We will once again start with N-Regions, the collection of all regions that contain
exactly N simultaneous space-time points.
The intrinsic structure of phase consists in two primitive relations:
• A three-place relation Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness (CP),
• A four-place relation Phase–Congruence (∼P).
Interpretation: CP(a, b, c) iff the phase of N-Region b is clock-wise between those of
N-Regions a and c (this relation realizes the intuitive idea that 3 o’clock is clock-wise
between 1 o’clock and 6 o’clock, but 3 o’clock is not clock-wise between 6 o’clock
and 1 o’clock); ab ∼P cd iff the signed phase difference between N-Regions a and b is
the same as that between N-Regions c and d.
The intrinsic structures of Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness and Phase–Congruence
satisfy the following axioms for what I shall call a “periodic difference structure”:
All quantifiers below range over only N-Regions. ∀a, b, c,d, e, f :
C1 At least one of CP(a, b, c) and CP(a, c, b) holds; if a, b, c are pair-wise distinct,
then exactly one of CP(a, b, c) and CP(a, c, b) holds.
15Thanks to Sheldon Goldstein for helpful discussions about this point. David Wallace points out
(p.c.) that it might be a virtue of the nominalistic theory to display the following choice-point: one can
imagine an axiomatization of quantum state phase that involves only absolute phase differences. This
would require thinking more deeply about the relationship between quantum phases and temporal
structure, as well as a new mathematical axiomatization of the absolute difference structure for phase.
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C2 If CP(a, b, c) and CP(a, c,d), then CP(a, b,d); if CP(a, b, c), then CP(b, c, a).
K1 ab ∼P ab.
K2 ab ∼P cd⇔ cd ∼P ab⇔ ba ∼P dc⇔ ac ∼P bd.
K3 If ab ∼P cd and cd ∼P e f , then ab ∼P e f .
K4 ∃h, cb ∼P ah; if CP(a, b, c), then∃d′,d′′ s.t. ba ∼P d′c, ca ∼P d′′b; ∃p, q,CP(a, q, b),CP(a, b,p),
ap ∼P pb, bq ∼P qa.
K5 ab ∼P cd⇔ [∀e, f d ∼P ae⇔ f c ∼P be].
K6 ∀e, f , g,h, if f c ∼P be and gb ∼P ae, then [h f ∼P ae⇔ hc ∼P ge].
K7 If CP(a, b, c), then ∀e,d, a′, b′, c′ [if a′d ∼P ae, b′d ∼P be, c′d ∼P ce, then C(a′, b′, c′)].
K8 (Archimedean Property) ∀a, a1, b1, if CP(a, a1, b1), then ∃a1, a2, ..., an, b1, b2, ..., bn,
such that CP(a, a1, an) and CP(a, bn, b), where anan−1 ∼P an−1an−2 ∼P ... ∼P a1a2 and
bnbn−1 ∼P bn−1bn−2 ∼P ... ∼P b1b2.16
Axiom (K4) contains several existence assumptions. But such assumptions are
justified for a nominalistic quantum theory. We can see this from the structure of the
platonistic quantum theory. Thanks to the Schrödinger dynamics, the wave function
spreads out continuously over space and time, which will ensure the richness in the
phase structure.
With some work, we can prove the following representation and uniqueness
theorems:
Theorem 3.3 (Phase Representation Theorem) If<N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness,
Phase–Congruence> is a periodic difference structure, i.e. satisfies axioms (C1)—(C2) and
(K1)—(K8), then for any real number k > 0, there is a function ψ ∶ N-Regions × N-Regions→ [0, k) and there is a function f ∶ N-Regions → [0, k) such that ∀a, b, c,d ∈ N-Regions:
1. CP(c, b, a)⇔ f (a) ≥ f (b) ≥ f (c) or f (c) ≥ f (a) ≥ f (b) or f (b) ≥ f (c) ≥ f (a);
2. ab ∼P cd⇔ f (a) − f (b) = f (c) − f (d) (mod k).
3. ψ(a, b) = f (a) − f (b) (mod k).
Theorem 3.4 (Phase Uniqueness Theorem) If another function f ′ satisfies the condi-
tions on the RHS of the Phase Representation Theorem, then there exists a real number β
such that for all element a ∈ N-Regions , f ′(a) = f (a) + β (mod k).
16Here it might again be desirable to avoid the infinitary sentences / axiom schema by using plural
quantification. See Fn. 11.
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Proofs: see Appendix.
Again, the representation theorem suggests that the intrinsic structure of Phase–
Clockwise–Betweenness and Phase–Congruence guarantees the existence of a faithful
representation function of phase. But the intrinsic structure makes no essential
quantification over numbers, functions, sets, or matrices. The uniqueness theorem
explains why the gauge degrees of freedom are the overall phase transformations
and no further, i.e. why the phase function is unique up to an additive constant.
Therefore, we have written down an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of the
quantum state, consisting in merely four relations on the regions of physical space-
time: Amplitude-Sum, Amplitude-Geq, Phase-Congruence, and Phase-Clockwise-
Betweenness. As mentioned earlier but evident now, the present account of the
quantum state has several desirable features: (1) it does not refer to any abstract
mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual
arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why
the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom.17
3.4 Comparisons with Balaguer’s Account
Before discussing related topics, let me briefly compare my account with Mark
Balaguer’s account (1996) of the nominalization of quantum mechanics.
Balaguer’s account follows Malament’s suggestion of nominalizing quantum
mechanics by taking seriously the Hilbert space structure and the representation
of “quantum events” with closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces. Following orthodox
textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, he suggests that we take as primitives
the propensities of quantum systems as analogous to probabilities of quantum
experimental outcomes.
I begin by recalling that each quantum state can be thought of as a function
from events (A,∆) to probabilities, i.e., to [0,1]. Thus, each quantum state
specifies a set of ordered pairs < (A,∆), r >. The next thing to notice is that
each such ordered pair determines a propensity property of quantum
systems, namely, an r−strengthed propensity to yield a value in ∆ for
17Seeing my use of mereology and quantification over space-time points, some readers might
wonder whether the present account of the quantum state is sufficiently nominalistic. I think it is
often hard to give clear answers to such questions, given the diverse use of the term “nominalism.”
Hartry Field addresses such questions in Science Without Numbers (1980), but he still agonizes over
some of the choices he makes. Interestingly, W. V. Quine, after reading Field’s book, sent a letter to
Field, which is now included in the second edition of Science Without Numbers (2016). The second
paragraph of Quine’s letter is most salient here:
“What to count as nominalism is a question of no great importance, though I shall get
back to it. More important is the ontological economy and relative homogeneity that
you achieve, whatever one’s views of the objects that you keep. More important still,
perhaps, is the economy of theory that you gain by what you call intrinsic formulation;
namely, the resolving out of conventional units and measures in favor of the objective
invariances that underlie the quantitative laws.” (P-55)
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a measurement of A. We can denote this propensity with “(A,∆, r)”.
(Balaguer, 1996, p.218.)
After giving several informal arguments that we can prove representation theorems
for propensities,18 he defends the idea that they are “nominalistically kosher.” By
interpreting the Hilbert space structures as propensities instead of propositions,
Balaguer makes some progress in the direction of making quantum mechanics “more
nominalistic.”
However, Balaguer’s account faces two serious problems. First, Balaguer’s
account seems to suffer from the same foundational problem as platonistic versions
of orthodox quantum mechanics. If quantum states are thought of as functions from
events to probabilities, and if we go on to nominalize the experimental probabilities,
then what should we make of the actual events and quantum experiments them-
selves? No good answer has been offered by defenders of the orthodox quantum
mechanics. Moreover, as J. S. Bell argues persuasively, words such as “measurement,”
“observation,” and “observables” should have no place in the fundamental ontology
or dynamics of a physical theory; they are not only unprofessionally vague but also
conceptually ambiguous.19
Balaguer (p.c.) suggests that his proposal is not meant to be a proposal for a
complete ontology; we are free to add particles or other ontologies. But it is not clear
how Balaguer’s account relates to any mainstream realist interpretation of quantum
mechanics. This is because all three main interpretations—Bohmian Mechanics,
GRW spontaneous collapse theories, and Everettian Quantum Mechanics—crucially
involve the quantum state represented by a wave function, not a function from events
to probabilities. And once we add the wave function (perhaps in the nominalistic
form introduced in this paper), the probabilities can be calculated (by the Born rule)
from the wave function itself, which makes Balaguer’s fundamental propensities
redundant. Hence, it seems to me that Balaguer’s nominalistic propensities are either
ontologically incomplete or ontologically redundant.
An even more serious worry is about how to extend his account to the dynamics.
Towards the end of his paper, he admits that his theory is not complete without the
dynamics:
[W]hat is left unnominalized is the dynamics of the theory—in particular,
the Schrödinger Equation. But I don’t see any reason why this can’t
be nominalized in the same general way that Field nominalizes the
differential equations of Newtonian Gravitation Theory. It is not trivial
that this can be done, but I do not foresee any impediments. (Balaguer,
1996, p.223.)
But this is puzzling; for it is not clear what the dynamics could be on his theory. The
Schrödinger equation is a wave equation: it relates the time derivative of the wave
function to the the spatial gradient of the wave function with the interaction potential.
18It is not clear to me which theorems these should be.
19Bell (1989), “Against ‘Measurement,’ ” pp. 215-16.
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As we have emphasized, the wave function comes with two pieces of information:
the amplitude and the phase. Probabilities (or propensities) are given by the Born
rule to be the (normalized) squared amplitude. Balaguer’s nominalistic ontology,
containing only propensities, would leave out some important phase information,
and would be dynamically incomplete, from the point of view of the Schrödinger
equation. Even if we include the probability information of all possible experiments
(position measurements and any other measurements), there might not be any simple
dynamical equations relating them to other probabilities at other times. In other
words, Balaguer’s theory is likely to have incomplete dynamics or complicated
dynamics. Therefore, it seems nomologically inadequate.
In contrast, the present account of the quantum state contains information of both
the amplitude and the phase parts the wave function, which would be sufficient for
feeding into a nominalized version of the Schrödinger Equation, which would be
simple to write down. Moreover, the primitives and the representation theorems
in my account are much more perspicuous than Balaguer’s account and more
continuous with the main interpretations of quantum mechanics.
4 Relations to Other Issues
In this section, I will explain how my intrinsic and nominalistic account of the
quantum state relates to other issues in metaphysics of quantum mechanics.
4.1 “Wave Function Realism”
It may have occurred to some readers that the present account of the quantum state
provides a natural response to some of the standard objections to “wave function
realism.”20 According to David Albert (1996), to be a realist about the wave function
naturally commits one to accept that the wave function is a physical field defined
on a fundamentally 3N-dimensional wave function space. Tim Maudlin (2013)
criticizes Albert’s view partly on the ground that such kind of “naive” realism
would commit one to take as fundamental the gauge degrees of freedom such as the
absolute values of the amplitude and the phase and recognize empirically equivalent
formulations as metaphysically distinct. This “naive” realism stands in contrast with
the physicists’ attitude of considering the Hilbert space projectively and thinking
of the quantum state as an equivalence class of wave functions (ψ ∼ Reiθψ). Albert
and other defenders have responded by biting the bullet and accepting the costs. If
a defender of wave function realism were to take the physicists’ attitude, says the
opponent, it would be much less natural to think that the wave function is really a
physical field, in the sense of something that assigns physical properties to each point
20Wave function realists, such as David Albert, Barry Loewer, Alyssa Ney, and Jill North, are what I
call “3N-Fundamentalists.” They believe that the fundamental physical space for a quantum world
is 3N-dimensional. In contrast, primitive ontologists, such as Valia Allori, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon
Goldstein, Tim Maudlin, Roderich Tumulka, and Nino Zanghi, are what I call “3D-Fundamentalists.”
They believe that the fundamental physical space is 3-dimensional.
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in the 3N-dimensional space.
But the situation would be much different given our present account of the
quantum state. On the intrinsic and nominalistic versions of field theories, field
values at points or regions can be thought of as mathematical representation of
comparative relations obtaining among space-time regions. On the intrinsic theory of
the quantum state, it can be similarly thought of as two fields (amplitude and phase)
on the configuration space or two multi-fields on the physical space. Regardless
whether one believes in a fundamentally high-dimensional space or a fundamentally
low-dimensional space, the intrinsic and nominalistic account will recover the
mathematical representation unique up to certain transformations. In the case of
the quantum state, we recover exactly the right equivalence class of wave functions
(ψ ∼ Reiθψ).
This provides some defensive resources for the “wave function realists.” They can
use the intrinsic account of the quantum state to identify two field-like entities on the
configuration space (by thinking of the N-Regions as points in the 3N-dimensional
space) without committing to the excess structure of absolute amplitude and overall
phase.21
4.2 Future Work
Before concluding, let us briefly anticipate four lines of future research.
First, the intrinsic and nominalistic account of the quantum state described
above is the first step towards an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of quantum
mechanics. In future work, I will describe nomological constraints on the quantum
state: the Schrödinger dynamics, the Born rule, and square-integrability.22 One idea
of nominalizing the Schrödinger equation is to decompose it into two equations, in
terms of amplitude and gradient of phase of the wave function. The key would be to
codify the differential operations (which Field has done for Newtonian Gravitation
Theory) in such a way to be compatible with our phase and amplitude relations. To
nominalize integration theory, I plan to borrow some ideas from Zee Perry’s work
on the theory of scalar quantities and space-time. The Born rule would present new
conceptual challenges, as it is controversial what place probability can occupy in
a nominalistic ontology and what the bearers of comparative probability should
be. But this is a general conceptual problem for nominalistic physics, not just for
nominalistic quantum mechanics.
21Not surprisingly, the present account may also provide some new arsenal for the defenders of the
fundamental 3-dimensional space. The axiomatic structure of the quantum state fills in the concrete
details to the multi-field proposal in the recent literature.
22At this point, even without a nominalistic theory of integration yet, we can say something
about the requirement that the wave function is square-integrable. There are many equivalent
conditions to square-integrability. We can, for example, require that the quantum state amplitude
structure is continuous and has compact support at some point in time, say, the initial time. This,
by the conservation of squared-amplitude, will guarantee that the quantum state at all times is
square-integrable. Moreover, “continuity” and “compact support” are readily nominalizable with
Field’s resources.
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Second, we have described how to think of the quantum state for a system with
constant number of particles, but how should we think about particle creation and
annihilation? I think the best way to get a grip on that question would be to think
carefully about the ontology of a quantum field theory. One option (which may or
may not be the best option) would be to think of the quantum state for such a system
as being represented by a complex valued function whose domain is ⋃∞N=0R3N—the
union of all configuration spaces (of different number of particles). In that case,
the extension of our theory would be easy—just keep the axioms fixed but let the
elements be mereological sums of any tupled physical points, not just N-tuples.
Third, we have only considered quantum states for spinless systems in this paper.
The straightforward way to extend the present account to accommodate spinorial
degrees of freedom would be to use two comparative relations for each complex
number assigned by the wave function. This is certainly possible and conceptually
similar to the situation in the present account. But there are two worries. First, it
does not appear to be the most simple or most elegant extension. Moreover, this
method would reify absolute orientation in the spin space, a degree of freedom that
we regard as gauge. These two considerations together seem to suggest that the best
way to proceed might be to reify the value space, in the same way as Arntzenius and
Dorr (2011) have done in the context of differential geometry.
Fourth, as we have learned from the relational theories of motion and the
comparative theories of quantities, there is always the possibility of a theory becoming
indeterministic when drawing from only comparative predicates without fixing an
absolute scale.23 It would be interesting to investigate whether similar problems of
indeterminism arise in our comparative theory of the quantum state.
5 Conclusion
There are many prima facie reasons for doubting that we can ever find an intrinsic
and nominalistic theory of quantum mechanics. However, in this paper, we have
made some significant progress towards constructing it. In particular, we have
offered an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of the quantum state, consisting in just
four relations on the regions of physical space: Amplitude-Sum, Amplitude-Geq,
Phase-Congruence, and Phase-Clockwise-Betweenness. Not only does it have many
desirable features, qualifying it to be a better fundamental physical theory than
the platonistic version, it also provides an answer to Malament’s long-standing
conjecture about the possibility of nominalizing quantum mechanics. We have also
discussed possible ways of extending this account to a complete theory of quantum
mechanics.
Here we have focused on the quantum state, because it has no classical counterpart
and it seems to resist an intrinsic and nominalistic treatment. But the nominalistic
theory leaves room for including additional ontologies of particles, fields, mass
23See Dasgupta (2013), Baker (2014), Martens (2016), and Field (2016), preface to second edition, pp.
41-44.
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densities supplied by specific solutions to the quantum measurement problem such
as BM, GRWm, and GRWf; these additional ontologies are readily nominalizable.
Moreover, this study lends itself to several future lines of research on the meta-
physics of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. Finally, the formal
results obtained for the periodic difference structure might prove fruitful for further
investigation.
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4.
Step 1. We begin by enriching < N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness, Phase–
Congruence> with some additional structures.
First, to simplify the notations, let us think of N-Regions as a set of regions, and
let us now only consider Ω ∶= N-Regions / =P, the set of “equal phase” equivalence
classes by quotienting out =P. (a =P b if they form phase intervals the same way:∀c ∈ S, ac ∼P bc.)
Second, we fix an arbitrary A0 ∈ Ω to be the “zero phase equivalence class.”
Third, we define a non-inclusive relation C on Ω according to CP on N-Regions.
(∀A,B,C ∈ Ω, C(A,B,C) iff A,B,C are pairwise distinct and ∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ B,∀c ∈ C,
C(a, b, c).)
Fourth, we define an addition function ○ ∶ Ω ×Ω→Ω. ∀A,B ∈ Ω, C = A ○ B is the
unique element in Ω such that CB ∼ AA0, which is guaranteed to exist by (K4) and
provably unique as elements in Ω form a partition over N-Regions.
Step 2. We show that the enriched structure < Ω, ○,C > with identity element A0
satisfies the axioms for a periodic extensive structure defined in Luce (1971).
Axiom 0. < Ω, ○ > is an Abelian semigroup.
First, we show that ○ is closed: ∀A,B ∈ Ω, A ○ B ∈ Ω.
This follows from (K4).
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Second, we show that ○ is associative: ∀A,B,C ∈ Ω, A ○ (B ○C) = (A ○ B) ○C.
This follows from (K6).
Third, we show that ○ is commutative: ∀A,B ∈ Ω, A ○ B = B ○A.
This follows from (K2).∀A,B,C,D ∈ Ω:
Axiom 1. Exactly one of C(A,B,C) or C(A,C,B) holds.
This follows from C1.
Axiom 2. C(A,B,C) implies C(B,C,A).
This follows from C2.
Axiom 3. C(A,B,C) and C(A,C,D) implies C(A,B,D).
This follows from C2.
Axiom 4. C(A,B,C) implies C(A ○D,B ○D,C ○D) and C(D ○A,D ○ B,D ○C).
This follows from (K7).
Axiom5. If C(A0,A,B), then there exists a positive integer n such that C(A0,A,nA)
and C(A0,nB,B).
This follows from (K8).
Therefore, the enriched structure < Ω, ○,C > with identity element A0 satisfies the
axioms for a periodic extensive structure defined in Luce (1971).
Step 3. We use the homomorphisms in Luce (1971) to find the homomorphisms
for < N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness, Phase–Congruence>.
Since < Ω, ○,C > satisfy the axioms for a periodic structure, Corollary in Luce
(1971) says that for any real K > 0, there is a unique function φ from Ω into [0,K) s.t.∀A,B,C ∈ Ω:
1. C(C,B,A) ⇔ φ(A) > φ(B) > φ(C) or φ(C) > φ(A) > φ(B) or φ(B) > φ(C) >
φ(A);
2. φ(A ○ B) = φ(A) +φ(B) (mod K);
3. φ(A0) = 0.
Now, we define f ∶ N-Regions → [0,K) as follows: f (a) = φ(A), where a ∈ A. So
we have CP(c, b, a)⇔ f (a) ≥ f (b) ≥ f (c) or f (c) ≥ f (a) ≥ f (b) or f (b) ≥ f (c) ≥ f (a).
We can also defineψ ∶N-Regions ×N-Regions→ [0,K) as follows: ψ(a, b) = φ(A)−
φ(B) (mod K), where a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Hence, ∀a, b ∈ N-Regions, ψ(a, b) = f (a) − f (b)
(mod K).
Moreover, given (K5), ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈ D, ab ∼P cd⇔ AB ∼ CD⇔ A ○D = B ○C⇔ φ(A ○D) = φ(B ○C)⇔ φ(A) +φ(D) = φ(B) +φ(C) (mod K)⇔ ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈ D, f (a) + f (d) = f (b) + f (c) (mod K)
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⇔ ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈ D, f (a) − f (b) = f (c) − f (d) (mod K)
Therefore, we have demonstrated the existence of homomorphisms.
Step 4. We prove the uniqueness theorem.
If another function f ′ ∶ N-Regions → [0,K) with the same properties exists, then
f ′(a) − f ′(a0) mod K = ψ(a, a0) = f (a) − f (a0) mod K = f (a),
which entails that
f ′(a) = f (a) + β mod K,
with the constant β = f ′(a0). QED.
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